ABSTRACT:

In the late nineteenth century Luigi Galvani and Alessandro Volta famously debated the existence of an electricity specific to organic systems, then termed animal electricity. Despite flawed methods, the heart of Galvani’s argument proved accurate: animal nervous systems are driven by a unique breed of electricity. Nonetheless, “animal electricity” is now an antiquated term. Sparsely, scientists deploy the word “bioelectric” in reference to embodied currents; more often, however, electricity appears, confusingly, as a single material phenomenon that inhabits organic and inorganic systems alike. Here, I acknowledge consistencies between what happens in nerve fibers and in power lines; however, I argue that the assumption of a singular electricity--rather than electricities--obscures important distinctions between biology and technology.

What might otherwise seem a semantic quibble obtains new relevance as the twenty-first century reconfigures the human-machine relation. I consult discourse on brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) to demonstrate the hazy line between analogy and equivalence in the context of neuronal and synthetic circuits. Close reading of modern BCI literature is complemented by a social-historical analysis that traces the trajectory of human-machine electrical conflation from telegraphy through iPhones. I consider the implications of substance- versus process-based electrical ontologies and frame BCIs as a mechanism and microcosm for (mis)interpretations of the cyborgian subject as a continuous electric circuit. I argue that discussion of a singular electricity (1) elides material differences between humans and their machines; and (2) neglects the materiality of electricity itself, consequently minimizing awareness of human and environmental fragility.